This paper investigates the role of risk-aversion in the allocation of workers between formal and informal jobs in Ghana. In the model I propose risk-averse workers can opt between the free-entry informal sector and queuing for formal occupations. Conditional on identifying the riskier option, the model yields testable implications on the relationship between risk-preferences and workers' allocation. My testing strategy proceeds in two steps. First, I estimate expected income uncertainty through panel data and find it significantly higher in the informal sector. Second, using novel experimental data to elicit individual attitudes to risk, I estimate the direct effect of risk-aversion on occupational choices and find that, in line with the first result, more risk-averse workers are more likely to queue for formal jobs and less likely to be in the informal sector. The results bear important implications for the optimal design of employment policies and social security.
Introduction
Modern Development Economics is increasingly interested in the workings of labour markets. As explained by Fields (2005) , "the poor are poor because they earn little from the work they do" and it is now widely recognised that fighting poverty entails improving labour-market opportunities for the most disadvantaged. A crucial step in this process will be to gain a clearer understanding of how workers allocate themselves between different occupations and of the constraints they face in their occupational choices. In particular, as the divide between the formal and the informal sector of the economy deepens, identifying what drives workers into such different segments will enhance our understanding of the development process and will help us design more effective labour market policies. Banerjee and Newman (1993) lend strong theoretical support to these claims by showing how economic development can be modelled as a dynamic process of institutional change that ultimately depends on workers' occupational choices, given an initial wealth distribution. Once we have a clear motivation for studying workers allocation, we are faced with the question of how to model occupational choices in labour markets without state funded insurance mechanisms to support the unemployed. My approach in this paper will be to model the choices of individual workers between alternative job-options as a function of their attitudes to risk. In doing so, I will attempt to abridge a gap in the existing literature, which, in my opinion, has not dedicated enough attention to the effects that risk in occupational outcomes may have on the choices of risk-averse workers. The main innovation from this study will be the use of experimental data to elicit risk-aversion. During the summer of 2007 I carried out three weeks of behavioural experiments with a sample of Ghanaian workers who had previously taken part in a three-year household survey by the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE). The experiment consisted of a series of dichotomous decisions over 21 pairs of lotteries with real money prizes. Applying Maximum Likelihood techniques for the estimation of utility functions to this data, I have obtained a measure of individual risk-aversion that I can use to research the relationship between attitudes to risk and occupational choices. To guide the investigation, I formulate a theoretical model of sectoral choice with risk-averse workers, motivated by the empirical observation that occupational decisions are "risky" in two important dimensions. First, the process of job-search is inherently uncertain, since workers who seek employment are generally only successful with some limited probability and face the risk of remaining unemployed if their search fails. Second, conditional on finding a job, earnings volatility over "good" and "bad" states of the world can be substantial in some occupations. These two forms of uncertainty should both influence the expected utility that risk-averse workers receive from prospective jobs and they should ultimately affect workers' allocation. Based on this observation, I propose an extension to the classical Harris and Todaro (HT, 1970 ) model of inter-sectoral linkages and to its further development by Fields (1975) . In my model a worker can either seek employment in the formal sector or in the informal sector. If she chooses the former option/strategy, she will obtain a job with probability , while she will remain unemployed with probability . If, on the other hand, she chooses the informal sector, she will be employed with certainty (since the informal sector is presumed to be free entry), but her earnings will be subject to volatility over good and bad periods. These assumptions reflect the observed choice set available to workers in many developing countries, where earnings from informal jobs are easily accessible but highly volatile, while access to formal occupations, which pay more regular income streams, is rationed. In this setting, workers' occupational decisions are driven by their risk-aversion and by the relative magnitude of earnings uncertainty under different search strategies. Hence, conditional on being able to determine which strategy is riskier, the model yields testable implications on the relationship between workers' attitudes to risk and their sectoral allocation. My empirical strategy will test those implications in the context of the Ghanaian labour market. First, I will estimate the marginal effect of risk-aversion on sectoral allocation using a multinomial logit model. My main finding is that risk-aversion significantly increases with the likelihood of queuing for formal occupations, while it decreases with the likelihood of working in the informal sector. These effects are large and statistically significant. Second, using panel data on earnings, I will measure income uncertainty and I will conclude that in urban Ghana taking an informal job is on average a riskier option than queuing for a formal one, in terms of expected income uncertainty. These two findings are consistent with each other and in line with the predictions of the theoretical model. Moreover, they survive an extensive set of robustness checks against a number of potential limitations in the empirical setup, including issues of workers' misclassification into formal and informal employment categories, of imprecision in the estimation of risk-aversion and of the potential endogeneity of risk-preferences. My conclusion is that risk-preferences, like education and age, play an important role in determining occupational choices and, therefore, they should be taken more carefully into account when designing labour market policies for developing countries, especially if such policies are going to affect the degree of income uncertainty (and ultimately of risk) in different sectors of the economy. Employment schemes that produce highly volatile income streams, for instance, may fail to enhance welfare and they may result in low take-up if workers are sufficiently risk-averse, potentially causing a waste of development resources. Conversely, my results highlight the value of social protection and insurance, as instruments that can effectively assist workers in their occupational choices, enhancing their future employment prospects. As such, these tools should not be viewed as 'mere' transfer payments, but as powerful development tools. Given the novelty of the analytical framework and of my experimental dataset, the evidence presented in this paper extends beyond the context of developing economies, and certainly beyond the African context. It contributes to a nascent 4 literature from developed countries where direct measures of risk-aversion are used to investigate behaviour in the labour market. Among the most recent studies in this field, Brown et al. (2011) analyse the relationship between willingness to take financial risks and self-employment in the US and Pannenberg (2010) investigates risk-aversion among unemployed workers in Germany, and its relationship with reservation wages. My work is most closely related to Bonin et al. (2007) , who find that, among German workers, those with low willingness to take risks are more likely to work in occupations with low earnings risk. Their conclusion is consistent with my results from Ghana.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 I will introduce my model of occupational choices with risk-averse workers and income uncertainty, and I will present its implications for empirical testing. In Section 3 I will describe the survey data and the experimental dataset collected in the summer of 2007. Section 4 will outline the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method used to estimate workers' risk-aversion. In Section 5 I will introduce my empirical strategy, present my results and perform a number of robustness checks on them. Section 6 will conclude.
A model of occupational choices with risk-averse workers and earnings uncertainty
The model I propose builds upon the classical Harris-Todaro (HT, 1970) model of the dual economy (and more specifically on its later development by Fields, 1975) , extending its basic intuition in two interrelated dimensions. First, my theoretical framework will not be solely concerned with differences in expected earnings across sectors, but it will also take into account differences in earnings volatility and more generally in earnings uncertainty as determinants of occupational preferences. Second, I will relax the assumption of workers' risk neutrality to allow risk-aversion to play a role in the occupational decisions. Inspired by the Kenyan experience of the 1960s, Harris and Todaro (1970) set forth a compelling theory to explain rural-urban migration. Their model postulates that workers compare the expected incomes in the urban sector with agricultural wage rates and migrate if the former exceeds the latter. Urban sector wages are assumed to be set institutionally above market clearing and urban unemployment results. On the other hand, it is assumed that there is always full-employment in agriculture. Rural-urban migration acts as an equilibrating force, until the expected urban wage eventually equates the rural wage. As noted by Fields (1975) , migration could be more generally regarded as an adjustment mechanism by which workers allocate themselves between different segments of the labour market, while attempting to maximise their expected incomes. In this light, the original HT model can be used to analyse the movement of workers across the formal and the informal sector of the economy (Fields, 1975) . In the formal sector, generally defined as the sum of public sector workers and employees or owners of large private businesses (a precise definition will be provided in the next section), wages above market clearing cause unemployment (possibly due to institutional constraints, such as union bargaining and minimum wage laws, as well as efficiency wage setting). On the other hand, there is always full-employment in the freely accessible informal sector, commonly defined as the sum of salaried workers and entrepreneurs in small/micro enterprises. To choose their preferred job-options, workers compare the expected wage in the formal sector with the wage in the informal sector. An equilibrium is reached once the flows of workers equalise the expected wages in the two sectors. One major shortcoming of the HT model is the assumption of risk-neutral workers, who are presumed to compare the expected income from different occupational prospects without taking into account earnings volatility/uncertainty in the different occupations. This is in stark contrast with most economic theories, where workers are generally assumed to display some degree of risk-aversion and to care about the degree of uncertainty associated with their occupational choices. It is even more at odds with the reality of Developing Countries, where it is not uncommon to observe high earnings volatility, which tends to be higher in certain sectors compared to others. For instance, a salaried worker in a large firm in the formal economy is generally less likely to experience a negative (or positive) shock to his income than a petty trader in the market, whose earnings are generally characterised by heavy idiosyncratic variations and are not protected by a formal contractual agreement. Therefore, it seems rather unrealistic to assume (like in the standard HT model) that an individual can base her occupational decisions on expected earnings only, without taking into account the degree of volatility of those earnings. More plausibly, we should model workers as choosing among different income lotteries, corresponding to the different occupational sectors, some of which are characterised by higher risk than others. To be more precise, I will refer to earnings distributions, rather than income lotteries. The nature of these distributions, as defined by their first two moments, determines the riskiness of an occupation. In what follows I will formalise this intuition in a model of occupational choices that will deliver clear-cut testable implications. As in Fields (1975) and in Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2008) , my model extends HT (1970) to allow for the co-existence of an informal and a formal sector in urban labour markets. The former is free-entry, in the sense that whoever wants an informal job can get one. This is quite plausible, especially in urban contexts, where it only requires some minimal investment to produce some good or service that can be sold in a casual marketplace (Fields, 2005) and where low institutional barriers as well as a weak regulatory environment are unlikely to place significant constraints on the possibility of starting small-scale informal economic activities. The low values of fixed capital reported by the majority of the self-employed in our sample are supportive of this view. The left-hand side of Figure 1 in the empirical appendix shows that a large proportion of the selfemployed (about 36%) reported having no fixed capital in 2006 (defined as the value of tools, equipment and structures).
1 Moreover, those who had some fixed 6 capital reported very low values of such capital. The right-hand panel in Figure  1 shows that 60% of those workers reported a replacement value of their capital that was equal to only a month of current profit or less, and up to 80% of those workers could replace their entire capital stock with 3 months worth of profits or less). 2 On the other hand, the formal sector comprises the most desirable, stable and well-paid occupations that are only accessible to a minority of the labour force. Access to those occupations tends to be regulated by formal contracts (e.g. civil servants and employees in large private enterprises) and by a more 'structured' recruitment process (e.g. where workers are asked to provide a formal proof of their qualifications), and it is therefore likely to be a lengthier process, which motivates the idea of a 'queue'. Institutional wage setting above market clearing (especially in the public sector), in the tradition of dual economy models à la HT, tends to corroborate the idea of rationing and queuing. Although the assumption of a two-sector economy might seem like an over-simplification of reality, it enables us to capture the main insights from the Dual-Economy approach, while keeping the mechanics simple. The model operates over two adjacent periods, which I will call and . In period , worker , who is assumed to be initially job-less, has a choice between searching/queuing for formal employment (Q) and searching for an informal sector job (or, equivalently, setting up her own informal business), (I). The two strategies are mutually exclusive, an assumption that carries some obvious limitations but seems to find support in my dataset from Ghana. Figure 2 in the empirical appendix shows that 84 percent of all the formal wage-employed in the GHUPS sample were 'unemployed' before finding their current occupation, while only 16 percent came to their current job directly from self-employment. (and vice-versa) . Second, if seeking employment in the informal sector carries some degree of negative stigma (because informal workers are perceived to be inferior in terms of skills and productivity), people who aspire to formal employment will keep clear of the informal labour market. Similarly, if aspirations play a role in sector allocation, workers who aspire to formal employment may refuse to take up informal employment in the meantime. Third, workers who choose to set up their own informal business will have little or no time (nor, probably, motivation) left to seek formal employment in the meantime.
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now have a job with certainty (reflecting the free-entry nature of informal jobs), but she will face a bad or a good period with probability and respectively. 5 In a good period she will earn , while in a bad year she will get (where ). 6 On the other hand, if she has chosen to search for a formal job, she will have gotten one with probability , in which case she will earn a wage in period . With probability , instead, her search will have been unsuccessful and she will be unemployed at , falling back on some minimal income level from external sources, (e.g. financial support from her family).
The most important feature of the model is the introduction of uncertainty in the outcomes of both strategies. In the informal sector, the source of uncertainty is the volatility of earnings between good and bad states. In the formal sector, instead, the wage is constant, but the search for such jobs is only successful with some probability . This is clearly an oversimplification of reality, but it aims to capture a dichotomy that is commonly observed in the labour market. In the formal sector, as it is generally described in the literature (see Fields 2005) , working conditions and salaries are more stable than in the "murky" sectors of the economy, where the absence of formal contractual arrangements and the unsteady economic environment are among the causes of highly uncertain earnings streams. However, it is generally recognised that access to the best jobs is rationed and that the process of search is inherently uncertain. Moreover, the supporters of Segmented Labour Market theories, who have strongly advocated the presence of institutional wage-setting as a source of segmentation in the labour market, would support the view that different segments also differ in terms of earnings stability (Leontaridi, 1998) . The model is solved by backward induction, with the worker choosing in period the occupation that yields the higher expected utility in period . 8 All 5 For simplicity, throughout the analysis and also in the empirical section I will assume that bad and good years are equally likely, i.e. 6 It should be remarked that the job-prospects of a worker in different occupations are allowed to depend on the worker's personal characteristics (this is the reason for indexing all the above quantities and probabilities by ). For instance, a worker who is more educated or more experienced may have higher and a higher , than a relatively unskilled one (because he is more productive and, perhaps, more effective at job-search). This is in line with the classical Mincerian approach to earnings functions; in the empirical analysis, I will control for these observables when I attempt to disentangle the effect of risk-aversion from the other determinants of a worker's job-choice. 7 Workers who remain unemployed will effectively return to period , together with all the new unemployed workers who have just lost their (formal or informal) jobs (for reasons we do not model explicitly). For the sake of simplicity, the model treats occupational decisions over subsequent periods of unemployment as repetitions of the same game. 8 Period , the 'choice and search' period, only lasts the time necessary to choose a strategy and find out if the search process is successful (both of which can be thought of as instantaneous events). For this reason, only payoffs at are assumed to influence utility. The model could have equivalently been constructed on a single period, at the beginning of which workers make their choice between the two employment strategies. The current set-up simplifies the exposition and the definition of expectations. 8 workers have the same utility function, but they differ in their degree of riskaversion. We assume the following CRRA utility specification.
where is the level of earnings accruing to individual from occupation is the individual coefficient of relative risk aversion (If is risk-prone/loving, if is risk-neutral, if is risk-averse). Informal" Utility only depends upon consumption and therefore ultimately upon earnings. As Fields (2005) states, this is a reasonable assumption in the context of developing countries where a large number of people value additional goods greatly compared to additional leisure and it would not be unreasonable even to replace utility maximisation with income-maximisation. Risk-attitudes are captured by the parameter , which can take both negative (risk-lovingness) and positive (risk-aversion) values. As already mentioned, while in the classic Harris and Todaro framework a worker compares the expected income from two alternative occupations, in this model she compares the expected utilities from the two search strategies. In fact, she will choose to seek formal employment if and only if:
In order to determine how risk-aversion affects a worker's choice, it is necessary to determine how the expected utilities from the two strategies compare as increases and as the relative riskiness of the two job-options changes. To answer this question I have simulated expected utilities from the two strategies at increasing levels of and under different assumptions on the relative magnitude of the first two moments of the income distributions in the two sectors. From the results of these numerical exercises (contained in the Empirical Appendix), I have distinguished the following four representative cases, with four corresponding analytical results, which will be tested in the Section 5. I will only describe the first two in detail, since case 3 and 4 are exactly symmetric and produce the exact opposite results. All four of them, with the corresponding results, are summarised in Table 1. Case 1 "Expected Earnings from seeking formal employment (Q) are lower than expected earnings from seeking informal employment (I),
; the variance of earnings from Q is lower than the variance of earnings from I, . In this case, Q is the safer option, and a worker who is sufficiently risk-averse will be willing to accept a lower expected income from formal-job-search in exchange for a lower variance of earnings (i.e. lower uncertainty). This is the scenario represented in Simulation 2, 3 and 4.
Result (1): There exists a positive level of individual risk-aversion, above which a worker who faces the employment prospects described by Case 1 will prefer Q over I.
Case 2:
"Expected Earnings from Q are higher than expected earnings from I, ; the variance of earnings from Q is lower than the variance of earnings from I, ". In this case, Q pays higher expected earnings with lower variance. Therefore, a worker will prefer Q over I at any level of positive risk-aversion. However, there is a low enough negative level of riskaversion (a high enough level of risk-lovingness) below which a worker will prefer the risky option (I), even though it pays less on average. This is the scenario depicted in simulation 5 and 6.
Result (2):
There exists a negative level of individual risk-aversion above which a worker who faces the employment prospects described by Case 2 will prefer Q over I. (1) and (2) together, we reach the following Conclusion (and vice-versa for Result 3 and 4), which will be central in the empirical analysis:
there will be a (positive or negative) level of riskaversion above which a worker will choose Q over I. Hence, the higher is a worker's risk-aversion, the higher the likelihood that he will choose to search/queue for a formal job (Q) over seeking an informal sector job (I)"
This is the proposition that I will attempt to test empirically in Section 6, conditional on being able to determine which one of the above four hypothetical cases best describes the options available to workers. 
Data
This paper makes use of two matched sources of data, the Ghana Household Urban Panel Survey (alternatively referred to as GHUPS or UPS henceforth) and an experimental dataset containing the choices made by a sub-set of UPS respondents in a series of lottery games designed to elicit their attitudes towards risk. The UPS has been conducted since 2004 by the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University, in collaboration with the Ghana Statistical Office (GSO), and at the time of the risk-aversion experiment it spanned a period of three years (2004) (2005) (2006) . The sample was based on a stratified random sample of urban households from the 2000 census and it has been held to be representative of the Ghanaian urban population (RST, 2008) . The peculiar feature of the dataset is that it contains comparable information, including earnings data, on both wage-employees and self-employed workers in the formal and the informal sector, spanning over a period of three consecutive years. The distinction between formal and informal jobs is based on international standards. The International Labour Organisation and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean have defined the informal sector as the sum of non-professional self-employed, domestic workers, unpaid workers, and workers in small/micro enterprises.
10 I adopt the same definition in this paper and split those currently employed in my sample into informal sector workers, comprising the self-employed and the salaried workers in small/micro firms (max 10 employees) and formal sector workers, comprising employees of the public sectors and of large private firms (more than 10 employees in total). The resulting breakdown by survey wave is provided in the Table 1-3 in the Appendix. As acknowledged in Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2008) , surveying the earnings of the Self-Employed is a challenging practice, mainly because these workers tend to keep poor records of their activities. The UPS attempts to overcome this problem in two ways. First, concepts of "revenue", "business costs" and "profits" are explained to respondents in order to enhance the precision of their answers. Second, handheld computers are employed during the data collection to check for possible inconsistencies across related figures. Throughout this study, although I will generally use the terms "earnings" and "wages", I will actually be referring to real monthly earnings, using 1995 as the base year to calculate the inflation figures. Finally, to detect unemployment, the UPS uses the phrasing suggested by the International Labour Organisation. The standard ILO definition of an unemployed person in low-income countries is a person who did no work for pay in the preceding week, not even for one hour.
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The Experimental Dataset contains the decisions made by a sub-sample of survey respondents in a series lottery games designed by Dr Abigail Barr at the University of Oxford and conducted by the author, in collaboration with the GSO, during the summer of 2007.
12 A representative subset of 288 respondents from the UPS was invited to participate in a number of workshops, where they were presented with a series of 21 lottery games. 13 In each game (two examples of which are presented in the Empirical Appendix) they were asked to choose between two alternative lotteries. Each lottery took the shape of an opaque bag containing a number of coloured marbles. To each colour we attached a money prize and each respondent was asked to choose from which of the two bags he would prefer to pick a random marble. At the beginning of the task each participant was told that, once they had made their 21 choices, one would be picked at random and acted out, i.e., we would let them pick a marble from the bag they chose in that case and pay them the corresponding winnings. The winnings of the gamble ranged from 10,000 to 110,000 CEDIs, with average winnings calibrated just above 30,000 CEDIs. This sum was estimated to be larger than the average daily earnings of a worker in our sample 14 . It is therefore reasonable to argue that the prizes at stake were high enough to induce truthful revelation of risk-preferences. By applying a maximum likelihood routine developed by Glenn Harrison (2007) to this dataset, one can derive an estimate of each of the participant's individual Coefficients of Relative Risk Aversion. Table 1 in the Empirical Appendix reports key summary statistics by sector of occupation for the experimental sample. As one would expect, it shows that age, gender, education, marital status and family background are important correlates of occupational status. Unemployed workers are the youngest in the sample and their level of education is similar to workers in the formal sector. Informal sector workers tend to be less educated and are most likely to have a family.
Estimation of individual CRRA using Experimental Data
The experiment conducted in Ghana over the summer of 2007 was designed to provide estimated coefficients of CRRA for each of the participating individuals. By applying a statistical methodology designed by Glenn Harrison (2007) , I can generate a distinct estimate of CRRA for each individual. This estimate is based on the assumption that all the participants in the experiment have a simple utility function of the form
, where x is the lottery prize and 1 is the CRRA parameter that we wish to estimate. So, corresponds to risk-neutrality, to risk loving and >0 to risk aversion 15 . This is the same utility function as the one which underlies the occupational choice model and for this reason the coefficients of risk aversion estimated from the lottery games can be directly transferred to our study of job-decisions. The estimation method consists of a separate maximum likelihood estimation (using a customised likelihood functions by Harrison (2007) ) for each individual, designed to identify the value of that best explains all of their 21 choices. The results of the estimation, carried out in collaboration with Dr Abigail Barr, are the following. The maximum likelihood estimator converged for 274 of the 288 subjects (90%). Of the 274 ML estimations undertaken, 259 returned estimates of r within the acceptable range and with acceptably small standard errors. So, after rejecting outliers, we obtain estimated for nearly 90% of the individuals who took part in the experiment. The mean estimated for these 259 participants is around 0.43, indicating moderate risk aversion. The distribution of these estimates is presented in Figure 1 . The graph indicates that, according to the point estimates, only 10% of the individuals are risk-loving.
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15 If needed, I will assume ( when . 16 My estimation strategy, based on a CRRA specification, rests on the assumption that workers do not integrate their game endowments with their liquid wealth when they take part in the games. This allows me to exclude issues of reverse causality from accumulated wealth (which may itself be a function of occupational choices) to risk-aversion in the experiment. Recent evidence from a similar experiment by Andersen et al. (2011) has shown that only minimal integration occurs. The authors report that their respondents "...behave as if some small fraction of personal wealth is combined with experimental prizes in a utility function". Moreover, their evidence comes from a developed country (Denmark), where average endowments of liquid wealth were larger, relative to game winnings, than in our experimental setting in Ghana, where 13
Empirical Results
The goal of this section will be to test the implications of the theory and to investigate the empirical relationship between risk-aversion and occupational choices. First, using a limited dependent variable estimator with CRRA among the explanatory variables, I will model the likelihood of being in each of the following occupational categories (which together comprise all the workers in my sample): informal sector, formal sector and unemployment. 17 To test the implications of the theory, the last category will proxy workers who are waiting (queuing) for better opportunities, as in the simple model I proposed (merits and limitations of this approximation will be discussed in detail in the next sections). In section 5.2 I will discuss some fundamental estimation issues and perform a number of robustness checks on the results. Finally, in section 5.3 I will gauge the degree of earnings uncertainty from different job-options, exploiting both the cross-sectional and the panel dimension of the dataset. I will then be able to interpret my main empirical findings in light of the theoretical model. average wealth is minimal. Ideally, I would have liked to include wealth directly in the model, but information on respondents' wealth was not collected at the time of the experiment, and the previous waves of GHUPS do not contain a satisfactory proxy. Including family income in the empirical model of the following sections is my best available strategy. 17 Recall that according to our definition the informal sector includes the self-employed and the salaried workers in small/micro firms (max 10 employees in total). The formal sector includes public sector workers and those employed in large private firms (more than 10 employees in total). 
Empirical model of sector allocation
Occupation sorting will be modelled using a classic latent variable approach, similar to the one used by Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2008) . The main novelty, in this case, will be the introduction of CRRA among the right hand side variables. This approach is in line with my theoretical model whereby workers choose the sector with the highest expected utility. The latent variable , which can be considered as the propensity of worker to sort into sector and time , will be a function of the same variables which the model predicts should drive expected earnings (and hence expected utility) from each sector. I model it as follows: where indexes different job categories: Informal (I), Formal (F) and Queue of Unemployed Job Seekers (Q)
, indexes the three waves of data. is a matrix of individual characteristics, including the estimated coefficients of relative riskaversion is the vector of multinomial logit coefficients is a sector-and-period-specific error term
The condition for choosing category over the others is that:
If we define , the condition for choosing sector in period becomes Following McFadden (1973), I assume that the 's are independent and identically Gumbel distributed (the well-known IIA assumption). It follows that their cumulative and density functions are respectively: and . From this model, it is possible to derive the following result, which constitutes the core of the Multinomial Logit:
Using this expression, I can obtain consistent maximum likelihood estimates of , and from those estimates I can compute the marginal effects of each regressor on the probability of employment in any one sector. This method hinges upon the validity of the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This would be least likely to hold in the presence of close substitutability between different occupational options. Given the clear distinction which seems to exist between different sectors of the Ghanaian labour market, it can be deemed unlikely that the same worker could be indifferent between different employment strategies. In their paper on occupational choices in Ghana, Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2008) set up a similar Multinomial Logit and they indeed accept the IIA assumption to be valid. It should be remarked that in my model a worker only has a choice between joining the informal sector and searching for formal employment. The latter option might also be interpreted as joining a queue of "unemployed jobseekers" until a job opportunity becomes available. In other words, since access to the formal sector is rationed, workers cannot opt for a formal job directly (as it is the case in the informal sector), but they can only choose to search/queue for one, remaining unemployed in the meantime. It follows that the hypothesis we should test is whether risk-aversion has an impact on the likelihood that workers will sort into the two categories that are open to them: the informal sector and the queue of unemployed formal job seekers. The full set of results from the estimation of the multinomial logit is reported in Table 5 in the Empirical Appendix. Below I report the marginal effects (with corresponding standard errors) of all the regressors on the likelihood of being in the job-queue (Table 2 ) and on the likelihood of being in the informal sector (Table 3) 18 . As explained, these are the two categories between which workers can be presumed to have a choice, and therefore, only the marginal effect of CRRA on the likelihood of choosing these two sectors can possibly be interpreted in light of the model (this is why I do not compute the same marginal effects for the third category, the formal employees). My main finding is a positive and statistically significant marginal effect of risk-aversion on the likelihood of being in the queue of formal job seekers and a negative one on the probability of being in the informal sector. From the first specification (Column 1), it emerges that increasing relative risk-aversion by 1 increases the likelihood of queuing by 20.7 percentage points and reduces the likelihood of being in the informal sector by 21.8 percentage points when we do not control for other variables. In column 2 to 4, I introduce a number of controls for workers' characteristics which constitute the most likely determinants of occupational choices other than risk-aversion. From the perspective of the theoretical model, these variables should be viewed as determinants of a worker's expected earnings (in the formal and the informal sector), expected earnings volatility (in the informal sector) and probability of finding a formal job ( . These are the elements 18 This is more convenient than reporting the estimated coefficients, 's, which in a multinomial logit model do not have a direct interpretation. The marginal effects are non-linear functions of all the regressors and, following common practice, I choose to evaluate them at the mean of . 19 It is well documented that Gender, Age and Years of Formal Education are important determinants of a worker's earnings and, as discussed above, they might also drive her earnings volatility if they affect her ability to deal with unexpected shocks. Moreover, Rankin, Sandefur and Teal (2008) show that these variables, and in particular formal education, are important determinants of the probability of employment in the formal sector (i.e. people who are more educated are considerably more likely to have a formal job).
which, in the model, were shown to determine the expected utility from different occupational strategies and as such, they constitute the main drivers of occupational choices together with CRRA. I also include dummy variables to control for period-specific effects (e.g. periods of recession causing higher rates of unemployment). With these controls in place I observe a reduction in the marginal effect of CRRA (in absolute terms). In particular, including linear (in 2) and non-linear (in 4) terms for age and education, and gender, reduces the marginal effect on the probability of queuing to 0.172 (in 2) and 0.148 (in 4) and it also reduces (in absolute terms) the marginal effect on the likelihood of informal employment to -0.177 (in 2) and -0.155 (in 4). These are still large effects and they remain statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively. The year dummies, in column 3 and 4 do not seem to have any significant impact on the likelihood of queuing and they do not change the marginal effect of CRRA once they are introduced. To gauge the strength of the CRRA marginal effect, it helps to realize that moving from the 20 th percentile point in the distribution of CRRA to the 80 th percentile point (a difference of 0.4134 in CRRA), increases the likelihood of queuing by an average 6.1 percentage points (Spec 5). In comparison, increasing education by 3 years (the duration of Junior Secondary School, Senior Secondary School or a University Bachelor in Ghana) increases the likelihood of queuing by an average of 8 points. Risk-aversion, together with education and age, is clearly associated to occupational status: younger, more educated and more risk-averse people are significantly more likely to be in the queue of unemployed workers than to work in the informal sector. Specification 6 introduces controls for the marital status of the worker, for whether he/she is the head of the household and for the number of his/her children. The reason for having these variables in the model is that, within my dataset, they constitute some potential determinants of both risk-aversion and likelihood of employment, and I want to investigate whether omitting them from the previous specifications had caused any bias in the estimated effect of CRRA. For instance, the head of the household could be presumed to be more risk-averse than other members of the same family, since she is in charge not only of her own well-being, but also of the well-being of the other family members. At the same time, she might be expected to be more likely employed than the rest of her family, precisely because household headship tends to be assigned to the principal income earner. Marital status and children can also affect occupational outcomes through a number of channels (e.g. women who are married and have many children are more likely to be unemployed), while they could also have an impact on a person attitudes to risk. Nevertheless, when I include these variables, I observe only a small change in the estimated marginal effect of the CRRA on both the likelihood of queuing and of being employed in the informal sector, rejecting the concern of significant omitted variable biases in the previous specifications. Finally, in column 5 and 7, family income per capita is introduced as an additional control. This is the closest approximation I have available for (i.e. the external income upon which a job seeker can rely until her search is successful) which, as discussed in section 3, represents another important determinant of occupational choices, since it affects the expected utility from choosing to queue. Specifically, being able to rely on high enough non-labour income, makes the prospect of unemployment less dramatic and it reduces the risk of searching for a job in the formal sector. An additional reason to control for family income per capita is that in this way I can address a potentially important issue of simultaneity between CRRA and Employment. This would be a concern if, for instance, workers who are currently unemployed and cannot rely on financial support from external sources tend to reveal higher riskaversion in the lottery games (since they may prefer some low but safe winnings to help sustain their living). Interestingly, when I control for family income per capita, I do not find evidence of any such simultaneity, as the marginal effect of CRRA does not change significantly in Table 2 (where it drops from 0.15 to 0.12) and it only slightly increases (in absolute terms) in Table 3 (where it goes from -0.155 to -0.182). In the last specification, where I include all the regressors proposed, the marginal effect of CRRA is almost unchanged in magnitude, though it becomes just insignificant in the first table. The substantial drop in sample size (due to the unavailability of family income per capita in 2006), is the most likely determinant of such drop in precision. Figure 2 and 3 translate the results from the Multinomial Logit into a graphical representation. There, I plot the predicted likelihood of being in each of the three possible categories against the whole range of estimated coefficients of relative risk-aversion, while holding the other regressors at their mean. In Figure 2 , I plot the results from specification 4 above, while Figure 3 summarises the results in specification 5. Since the marginal effects in the Multinomial Logit are non-linear functions of the regressors, these graphs are more informative than the Table 2 and 3. I also plot the 95% confidence intervals around the predicted probabilities, to investigate whether they are statistically different from one another. The results are clear and they largely confirm my conclusions so far. There is a positive relationship between riskaversion and the likelihood of queuing for formal jobs, while the opposite relationship exists between CRRA and the likelihood of informal employment (throughout the whole range of CRRA values). For completeness, I have also plotted the predicted probability of being in the formal sector, although, as argued above, we do not expect risk-aversion to have a direct causal impact upon it. This probability remains very low throughout the graph and indeed, it does not seem to be significantly affected by changes in CRRA.
My conclusion is that a positive relationship between risk-aversion and the likelihood of being in the unemployed queue (and a negative one between riskaversion and the likelihood of informal employment) exists and it is statistically significant. It should also be remarked that in Section 4 we estimated the large majority of our sample to have a coefficient of relative risk-aversion between 0 and 1. This turns out to be the domain over which the marginal effects of riskaversion are steepest, and the predicted probabilities most clearly follow different trends from one another. These results are consistent with my theoretical framework under case 1 and 2, when the model implies the existence of a switching point in the distribution of risk-aversion above which, ceteris paribus, workers turn from preferring informal employment to seeking formal jobs. This means that if CRRA is entered linearly in the multinomial logit, as above, its effect on the probability of being in the informal sector should indeed be negative (and vice-versa for the probability of queuing). The results, therefore, are in line with the main intuition from the theory, under case 1 and 2. To test the quantitative implications of the model more strictly, one could devise a more flexible specification to identify the CRRA thresholds directly. This method, however, has proven too demanding for the limited size of the dataset.
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20 Intuitively, one would need to observe a range of individuals with sufficiently similar personal and family characteristics at a given point in time, but displaying sufficiently granular variation in their coefficients of risk-aversion, to be able to detect potential points of discontinuity above which the probability of queuing (being in the informal sector) increases (decreases) significantly. Even upon attempting a simpler estimation approach, with CRRA entered non-linearly in the model (e.g. as a linear plus a squared term), the data revealed its limitations, as it proved impossible to pin down with sufficient precision the linear and the nonlinear effect. 
Estimation issues and robustness checks
In this section I will attempt to address the main concerns surrounding the estimation strategy and I will carry out several robustness checks on my results.
First, my empirical analysis treats the current unemployed as representative of workers who are willing to wait (queue) for better income earning opportunities than those available in the informal sector. Despite its potential shortcomings, this approach allows me to test the implications of my simple theoretical setup on the basis of the following reasoning. The model I propose depicts the sector allocation of a worker who finds herself unemployed at a given point in time and can either take an informal job or wait for better opportunities. Ceteris paribus, the model shows the role played by risk-aversion in this process. Notably, if informal employment is easily accessible, under case 1 and case 2 the model implies that we should observe higher risk-aversion among those who have remained unemployed, since the least risk-averse can, ceteris paribus, move out of unemployment more rapidly by taking an informal job. The idea that barriers to informal employment are low is corroborated by a large literature. Using the UPS dataset, Falco (2012) shows that informal businesses operate with little to no capital in urban Ghana and their start-up costs are often negligible. An increasingly large body of evidence shows similar findings in many different contexts (McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) on Mexico and de Mel et al (2008) on Sri-Lanka are two influential studies in this field). 21 Of course, in the empirics one should not expect that all the unemployed are waiting for a job outside the informal sector. Given that each wave of the survey takes a snapshot of the economy at a given point in time, the unemployed pool should naturally include workers who are about to transition into informal activities. However, if the assumption of an easily accessible informal sector holds, the less risk-averse should move out of unemployment relatively rapidly and, upon analysing the data at any given point in time, we should expect the stock of the current unemployed to be characterised by higher risk-aversion.
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A second challenge to this approach is posed by the possibility that many of the current unemployed may in fact be inactive. Given that the GHUPS sample only contains individuals who are between 15 and 65 (and given the characteristics of the Ghanaian labour market, where formal unemployment insurance does not exist and 21 Several other studies show that informal businesses can operate with limited assets, basic technologies and limited human capital, pointing to minimal barriers to entry into the sector (Banerjee and Duflo (2005) review the literature and find that informal enterprises in developing countries are generally characterised by high (albeit heterogeneous) marginal returns to capital, which are often the reflection of very small capital stocks). Furthermore, the literature often portrays the informal sector as characterised by high churning and turnover rates, lending additional support to my working assumption of fast flows into informal occupations (see Falco et al. 2011 for a detailed discussion of sector mobility in Ghana using GUPS data). 22 Ideally, one might want to test the model more directly, by checking whether people who move out of unemployment into self-employment between survey waves have lower risk aversion than those who move out of unemployment into formal-employment, ceteris paribus. Unfortunately, given the small size of the sample and the short-time horizon covered by the dataset, we do not observe a sufficiently large number of transitions to test this hypothesis with any degree of confidence. It remains an open alley for future work. participation rates are high by international standards (World Development Indicators)), it seems sensible to assume that the large majority of the jobless in our sample would be willing to work if given a good opportunity; and since barriers to informal employment appear to be very low, it seems plausible to think that they may be waiting for better opportunities than currently available, ceteris paribus. Yet, a fraction of the unemployed may not, in fact, be seeking any form of employment, due, for instance, to high opportunity cost and constraints on their ability to work (e.g. family commitments). My empirical model tried to deal with this issue directly, via the inclusion of family traits in the empirical specification, such as income per capita and other family characteristics (such as marriage and children, which generally affect the labour supply decision). None of these variables changed the main results significantly. Indeed, it seems far-fetched to argue that a large portion of the working-age unemployed may be inactive in a context of widespread poverty and lack of social security. However, in order to gauge the extent to which this may be a concern for my results, I have repeated the analysis confining it to only the male workers in the sample. The idea behind this strategy is that female labour market attachment is generally lower than it is for male workers, and confining the analysis to men should greatly reduce the proportion of workers who are inactive. In other words, restricting the sample to the men should make the unemployed pool a more accurate approximation of the job-seekers, shedding light on the extent of the potential bias that may arise from misclassification. The results (which are included in the Empirical Appendix) largely confirm the findings I obtained using the entire sample. The direction of the marginal effect of CRRA remains the same, its size increases (indicating an even stronger effect for Men) and its statistical significance holds (See Table 6 and 7 in the Empirical Appendix), lending support to the idea that reducing potential mis-categorisation would strengthen the results.
Third, one may be concerned with the potential endogeneity of the experimental measure of risk-aversion with respect to the determinants of occupational choices. To gauge the potential interconnections, I have used the last wave of the panel (2006) to estimate a reduced form equation with CRRA as a function of all the controls in the multinomial logit (the results of this estimation are also contained in the Empirical Appendix). Quite strikingly, none of those variables, except being the head of the household, shows a significant relationship with risk-preferences, lending prima facie support to the conclusion that risk-aversion may indeed be exogenous with respect to most other determinants of occupational status. These results are consistent with my previous finding that including an extensive set of controls in the empirical model did not significantly change the estimated marginal effect of CRRA. Of course, I fully acknowledge the possibility that additional omitted sources of endogeneity may exist, but in the absence of reliable sources of exogenous variation (e.g. IV), I cannot devise a fully satisfactory strategy to tackle this problem 23 Recent evidence from behavioural economics, however, lends support to the idea that attitudes to risk are largely heritable (e.g. Zyphur et al. (2009) show this in a careful study on twins) and therefore exogenous to labour market outcomes that occur in adulthood (when the period of upbringing, during which attitudes are most malleable, is over). Existing empirical research on occupational choices and risk-aversion is implicitly based on this assumption, including the work by Bonin et al (2007) , whose approach and conclusions are most similar to mine. 24 Insofar as risk-aversion is instead time-varying and potentially endogenous to occupational outcomes, additional data will be required to rule out the existence of reverse causality. This remains an open alley for future research.
Fourth, given that my empirical strategy is driven by cross-sectional variation in attitudes to risk across different sectors of the labour market, the most natural way to use my panel dataset has been to pool observations from different survey waves into a unique cross-section. This approach is motivated by the design of my theoretical model, where workers' decisions are entirely based on current expectations of employment outcomes (i.e. expected earnings and expected variance of earnings). In other words, a worker chooses whether to queue for a formal job or to join the informal sector on the basis of her current expectations on the utility she will get from the two alternatives. Given that a worker's job-prospects can change over time and so can change her expectations (while their risk-aversion is assumed to be timeinvariant), we should expect occupational choices to change over the years and we should consider the sectoral choices of the same worker in two different years as separate (since they are based on potentially different expectations). 25 In fact, a nonnegligible fraction of workers is observed to change occupational status across survey waves. Including time-variant individual characteristics (e.g. age, children, marital status) in the Multinomial Logit and period-specific dummies was an attempt to allow for the possibility that employment conditions may evolve systematically with a worker' characteristics, causing significant changes in her occupational choices over the years. At the same time, I am aware of the imprecision of this pooling approach, arising from the fact that some unobserved determinants of the employment decisions will be correlated between observations on the same individual in subsequent years. To overcome this problem, I should remark that in all the previous estimations I relaxed the assumption of independence of the error components and I allowed for correlation between data on the same worker, correcting the standard errors accordingly. As a further check on the robustness of the pooling approach, I have also estimated the same multinomial logit separately on each wave of the panel (results for the latest wave are included in the Empirical Appendix). The results I have obtained are largely consistent with the ones above. 24 In the absence of a more convincing strategy to tackle the problem of endogeneity, my main findings (like Bonin et al.'s) could be interpreted as a carefully documented correlation between occupational status and a novel measure of risk-aversion from laboratory experiments. Even under this most cautious interpretation, they remain an important contribution to a very young literature. 25 To be precise, according to the theoretical model, the choice of a worker in period depends on her expectations (at time ) of earnings and earnings uncertainty in period . As argued above, period (the choice period) is short (it only spans the decision time) compared to period (the working period). Therefore, in the empirical analysis I can assume that both of them are contained within the span of one survey year. In this sense, it is reasonable to treat the choice of a worker at the time of a given survey wave as separate from her decision at the time of the next (and the previous) wave.
Although as a likely consequence of the reduced sample size precision decreases, the direction of the estimated marginal effects of CRRA remains the same and it is consistent across panel waves. This is indicative of the fact that with a larger crosssection, I should expect to improve upon the efficiency of my estimates, and that pooling across waves should not have distorted the nature of my results.
The last robustness check concerns a corollary prediction of the theoretical model: workers who queue for formal employment and are successful should have similar levels of risk-aversion as those who are still in the queue (since risk-aversion is assumed to be time-invariant) and significantly higher levels of risk-aversion than workers in the informal sector. This hypothesis is confirmed by the data (see Table  13 in the Empirical Appendix).
Finally, the measure of risk-aversion I have used throughout this analysis is itself an estimate obtained from fitting a choice model on my experimental dataset using maximum likelihood. As such, it carries an estimation error; and as the last check on the robustness of my results, I have explicitly accounted for this source of imprecision by re-weighting the sample according to the error attached to each value of CRRA. The results are reported in Table 11 and 12 in the empirical appendix and they show that, despite a slight drop in the magnitude of the estimated marginal effect of risk-aversion, the estimated patterns remain consistent with the discussion so far
In conclusion, it is important to remark that despite the potential limitations in the ability of the data to test the theoretical model I proposed, my empirical analysis documents an interesting relationship between occupational status and an independent and experimentally validated measure of risk-aversion, in the context of a developing country. This is a valuable finding per se, of which my simple theoretical setup gives a coherent explanation. The same finding may possibly be read through the lens of a different model without losing its value as a contribution to a nascent literature, which has only recently begun to find similar evidence in the context of developed countries (e.g. Bonin et al. (2007) ). 26 . 26 The next section will also show that earnings in the informal sector are significantly more volatile than earnings in formal occupations. Any alternative model of occupational choices should also account for this second result.
Estimation of earnings uncertainty
Having established the existence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between risk-aversion and the likelihood of being in the unemployed queue (and of a negative and statistically significant relationship between riskaversion and the likelihood of working in the informal sector), I will now attempt to ascertain whether these findings are in line with the theoretical framework proposed in Section 2. The Conclusion of my model is that, under Case 1 and 2, the likelihood of preferring formal job-search over informal employment should increase with a worker's risk-aversion. Therefore, for my empirical results to be consistent with the model, Case 1 or Case 2 should prove to be a plausible description of reality. Specifically, I will ask whether searching for a formal job is indeed the low-risk strategy, in the sense of a lower variance of earnings in period , compared to working in the informal sector. 27 To tackle this question, I will focus on a representative worker (call her "a") with average observed characteristics.
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First, I will estimate the income variance this average worker can expect if she chooses to queue for formal employment (i.e.
). According to the model, this is a function of her expected earnings in the formal sector ( ), of the outside income that she can fall back on if her search is not successful ( ) and of the probability of successful search ( ). To match the workings of the theory as closely as possible, I maintain the assumption that, conditional on seizing a formal job, worker can expect to earn with certainty at time . This is to say that worker knows the pay she can receive in the formal sector given her personal characteristics. To the extent that information about current wages in formal occupations is accessible to job-seekers, this is not an unrealistic assumption. By contrast, if she chooses to enter the informal sector, her earnings will be determined by a stochastic mechanism (i.e. they will be drawn from a given distribution), to capture the idea that informal earnings are not guaranteed by a formal contract. Ruling out ex-ante uncertainty in formal earnings (conditional on attaining employment) does not imply that wages in the formal sector will remain constant over time. They may indeed vary for a number of reasons, such as productivity growth, promotions and demotions.
29 I only assume that at the time of her choice worker knows the prevailing wage she will get at , conditional on being employed, and that she knows her probability of employment.
27 I will need to show that holds. 28 The reason for using this approach is that it pairs with the fact that the marginal effects from the multinomial logit were computed holding all the regressors at their average and therefore, the estimates in Table 2 and Table 3 were precisely indicative of the behaviour of an average individual in my sample. 29 One can expect the extent of this variation to be small compared to earnings variation in informal jobs, where pay is not tied to a formal contract and, in the absence of insurance, it is entirely left to the vagaries of the market. This presumption is confirmed by the data, which shows that variation in earnings for workers in the formal sector is only a fraction of earnings variation in the informal sector. The standard deviation of changes in earnings between any two years of the sample in the informal sector is five times larger than the standard deviation of changes in earnings between two years in the public sector, and three times larger than in the broader formal sector.
Moving to the empirics, I estimate (for every different year) using a Mincerian earnings regression of log-wages in the formal sector. 30 The minimal income level can be proxied by average family income per capita among the unemployed. The third component of is the probability that the average worker manages to get a formal job. The highest possible estimate of is equal, in any one year, to the ratio of the total number of formal jobs in the economy divided by the sum of formal jobs and unemployed people. The reason I consider this estimate to be an upper bound is that it describes a situation where all the formal jobs are suddenly vacated and become available to the sum of the previous and the new unemployed. If I assume, more realistically, that only a fraction of the formal jobs available is vacated at any given period, decreases. However, it can easily be shown that decreasing from its upper-bound value decreases monotonically. It follows that, once I can prove that holds at the upper-bound, the same inequality will automatically hold at any lower (and more plausible) value of . Given , and , the estimated variance of earnings for the average worker who chooses to queue for formal employment can be calculated as follows:
Next, I outline the estimation procedure for , the variance of earnings if the worker opts for the informal sector. In this case, her pay will be drawn from a distribution, which will depend on her personal characteristics. To estimate the variance of such distribution, I construct a sub-sample of workers in the informal sector with skills and experience similar to the average. 32 Then, I compute the variance of their earnings in every given year and I treat it as a proxy for . The idea is that, since I cannot actually observe the earnings of the same average individual in different states of the world, I assume that similar individuals should face similar earnings in the same job category and that the cross-sectional variation I observe among them is a good approximation of the uncertainty resulting from random shocks.
, where is a vector of individual earnings in the formal sector in period ; is a matrix of (possibly time-variant) individual characteristics, including gender, age (both linear and quadratic) and years of formal education (both linear and quadratic); is a random error component. 31 This is true as long as this upper bound for is lower than ½ (which is highly plausible, on both empirical grounds and on the basis of the assumptions generally made in this literature). Using this procedure, I obtain the following estimates of the model parameters and of the variance of (real monthly) earnings in the two sectors and in the two survey waves, for the average worker in my sample. In both years, the estimated variance of earnings in the informal sector is considerably (4 to 5 times) higher than the variance of earnings if the worker chooses to seek formal employment, indicating a much higher degree of income uncertainty to be expected from choosing strategy I (Informal sector) over strategy Q (Queuing for a formal job). This result corroborates the hypothesis that Case 1 and 2 from the theoretical model, which occur if , may indeed capture the reality of this labour market; and it suggests that the positive estimated relationship between risk-aversion and likelihood of queuing for a formal job is consistent with my simple theory of occupational choices. Working in the informal sector is the riskier job-option and the likelihood of choosing it over seeking formal employment should decrease in workers' risk-aversion.
An alternative and potentially more robust method to estimate the volatility of earnings under strategy I (i.e.
) would be to exploit the time-series dimension of my data to calculate the variance of the average worker's earnings in the informal sector over the three survey waves. This approach would be superior to the cross-sectional estimation used above, as a way to quantify earnings volatility over different states of the world. It would also constitute an improvement on previous work by Bonin et al. (2007) , who rely on cross-sectional earnings risk in their analysis of occupational sorting and risk-attitudes in Germany. In fact, the cross-sectional variance I calculated above might have been driven by unobserved differences among workers within the sub-sample "around the average", in which case it would constitute a poor estimate of volatility. The UPS dataset is ideally suited to solve this problem, since its panel structure allows me, in principle, to control for individual fixed effects and to isolate the variation in earnings that derives from idiosyncratic shocks in different periods. 34 Unfortunately, given the 29 short time-horizon covered in the data, this method cannot be applied effectively. Three survey waves (and therefore, three observations per individual) are clearly too few to obtain reliable estimates of individual earnings variances. Nevertheless, I will produce some evidence using this second approach, keeping in mind that it is only a tentative estimation of the object of interest. To do that, I will first compute the variance of individual earnings over the three years of data for workers in the informal sector. Then, I will average these estimates across the same sub-sample of "average workers" (i.e. workers with age and skills close to the average) that I used in the cross-sectional estimation. With sufficient data, this procedure should result in a robust estimate of the earnings volatility that an average worker can expect in any particular period if she works in the informal sector. 35 The results I obtain are the following:
In 2005:
In 2006:
These figures are still higher than the previously estimated variances of earnings from strategy Q, in both 2005 and 2006. My conclusion, therefore, remains the same: the informal sector is the riskier of the two options available to workers. Finally, I acknowledge the possibility that measurement error may lead to overestimating the variance and that such bias is likely to be more significant for informal businesses (that generally lack precise records). However, given the large difference in the magnitudes of the estimates above, I would be hesitant to attribute the entire gap to measurement error. Moreover, a recent methodological study by Fafchamps et al. (2011) in urban Ghana investigates the effectiveness of consistency checks, performed with handheld computers during data collection, in reducing the degree of measurement error in the earnings of informal worker. Their survey is conducted in very similar areas to the GHUPS, it uses a similar questionnaire and it is administered by a very similar team of enumerators. Their main finding is that "the vast majority of large changes in enterprise sales and profits are confirmed by firm owners as genuine, highlighting the volatility of income in this sector". 36 35 A more elaborate way to carry out the same estimation would be to design a reduced form equation for the time-variance of individual earnings, as a function of observable workers' characteristics, and to estimate its coefficients via regression techniques (e.g. OLS). I could then use these estimates to predict the variance of earnings for an average worker. The predictions I obtained when I tried this alternative approach confirmed the result that risk is higher in the informal sector. However, my estimates were rather imprecise and the explanatory power of the morel very low (this is why I have preferred the approach described in the main text). With additional earnings from the latest UPS wave I will be able to use this approach more effectively. 36 Furthermore, Fafchamps et al. (2011) find that while consistency checks did succeed in reducing the coefficient of variation and increase the autocorrelation of earnings data across survey waves, the overall effects on the distribution of earnings were fairly modest, since few of the observations were identified as errors and consequently changed, and the changes were not order of magnitude changes.
As a final point, it should be remarked that the measure of risk I have used throughout the analysis focuses on short-term income uncertainty (and on how this differs across the available employment strategies). An alternative approach would have been to isolate persistent shocks (from short-term fluctuations), which might constitute a more relevant dimension of risk for career choices if transitory fluctuations can be smoothed out through precautionary savings. I would challenge this view on the grounds that in an economy that lacks effective insurance and saving devices, short-term volatility is unlikely to be smoothed out entirely and may therefore impact consumption significantly, constituting a very relevant dimension of risk.
37 Evidence on the role of different types of shocks on employment dynamics in Latin America has been recently presented by Fiess et al. (2010) . Trying to separate out short term fluctuations form permanent shocks, using, for instance, the approach proposed by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) , would be an interesting extension to the analysis, but the limitations of our short panel foreclose this possibility until additional data becomes available.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated how attitudes to risk determine the allocation of workers to formal and informal occupations. A two-period theoretical model has been proposed, where workers choose between two alternatives: working in the free entry informal sector (defined as the sum of the self-employed and the salaried workers in small/micro enterprises) and searching for a formal occupation (in the public sector or in larger private firms). Both options are risky, though uncertainty ensues from two different sources. On the one hand, informal jobs are easily accessible but they produce a volatile income stream. On the other hand, earnings in the formal sector are not subject to stochastic fluctuations, but access to formal jobs is rationed and job-seekers face the risk of finding themselves unemployed if their search is unsuccessful. Following the structure of the model, I can weigh these two sources of uncertainty against each other and estimate the overall expected variance of earnings from either strategy, determining which one is 'riskier'. In accordance to our priors, the evidence shows that uncertainty is higher in the informal sector and, therefore, that we should observe more risk-averse workers to be less likely to sort into it. Such prediction is strongly confirmed in my empirical analysis. Using innovative econometric technologies for the estimation of utility functions, applied to an original dataset from lab-experiments conducted in Ghana, I estimate an exogenous measure of individual risk-aversion for a representative sample of Ghanaian workers. Including this measure among the explanatory variables in a limited dependent variable model of occupational choices, it emerges that risk-aversion decreases with the likelihood of being in the informal sector and it increases with the likelihood of being in the unemployed queue. The result survives a number of robustness checks.
The findings in this paper contribute to a nascent literature on the relationship between risk-aversion and occupational outcomes, which has largely focused on the US and Europe. Developing a better understanding of how risk-aversion affects workers' decisions will also be important to improve anti-poverty programmes that operate through the labour market. The main message from this paper is that, in the absence of social protection, risk-averse workers will be unable to take advantage of profitable employment opportunities which entail a sufficient degree of uncertainty, with adverse consequences for growth and poverty reduction. An important question left to be explored is whether poor workers are systematically more or less riskaverse than wealthier ones and if so, why.
38 This is only one of the research routes this paper leaves open. The broader question of how risk-attitudes originate deserves deeper investigation, given its potential relevance for both theoretical modelling and economic policy. Finally, this article contributes to a broader methodological debate on the benefits and drawbacks of using lab-experiments to estimate measures of risk-preferences that are suitable for the study of decisions under uncertainty.
